Your Agent May Misevolve:

Emergent Risks in Self-evolving LLM Agents

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Overview

- **Self-evolving agents** has received much attention due to their adaptive nature and strong capabilities



Figure from: Qiu et al. Alita: Generalist Agent Enabling Scalable Agentic Reasoning with Minimal Predefinition and Maximal Self-Evolution. arxiv 2505.20286.

Overview

- **Self-evolving agents** has received much attention due to their adaptive nature and strong capabilities
- However, the self-evolution process also introduces new risks



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- We systematically study the risk of **“misevolution”** across four evolutionary paths



Overview

- We systematically study the risk of **"misevolution"** across four evolutionary paths

> **Misevolution:** The process where an agent's self-evolution **deviates in unintended ways**, leading to **undesirable or even harmful** outcomes



- **Misevolution is prevalent**, even with frontier LLMs like Gemini-2.5-Pro!

Examples of Misevolution: Over-refunding



- A service agent **evolves memory** by storing interaction history
- May learn a biased correlation "refunding=happy user" from the memory

→ **Undesirable outcome**: proactively offer refunds even when not asked to

Examples of Misevolution: Ingesting Toxic Tools



- A coding agent **evolves toolset** by searching and ingesting tools from GitHub
- May incorporate seemingly useful but insecure code from a public repo

→ **Undesirable outcome**: data leakage

Examples of Misevolution: Cross-domain Tool Misuse



- An agent **evolves toolset** by self-creating new tools and reusing them
- In **normal** task A (sharing posters with participants): creates a tool that shares files by generating a public link
- In **privacy-sensitive** task B (sharing financial report with the board): reuses the tool

→ **Undesirable outcome**: privacy issues, leaving a public link susceptible to cyber attack

Background: Core Components in LLM Agents

An agent system π_θ is typically parameterized by four core components $\theta = (\mathcal{M}, mem, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{W})$

- $\mathcal{M}$: the underlying language model
- mem: memory
- $\mathcal{T}$: the set of tools
- $\mathcal{W}$: predefined workflow/pipeline* in a multi-agent system



Figure adapted from: https://lilianweng.github.io/posts/2023-06-23-agent/

*A fixed workflow predefines agent invocation and role assignment, and is thus not strictly agentic by today's standards

Background: Self-evolving LLM Agents

- **Single task execution:** Given task T, agent generates trajectory $\tau = (s_0, a_0, s_1, a_1, \ldots, s_k)$, receives feedback r
- **Evolution function f:**

$$\theta' = (\mathcal{M}', mem', \mathcal{T}', \mathcal{W}') = f(\theta, \tau, r)$$

- **Inter-task evolution process**: Over a sequence of tasks $\{T_i\}_{i=0}^{n}$, the agent's components evolve iteratively via

$$\theta_{i+1} = f(\theta_i, \tau_i, r_i)$$

- **Objective**: the primary goal in designing a self-evolving agent is to construct an evolution function f that maximizes a cumulative utility:

$$\max_f \sum_{i=0}^{n} u(\tau_i, r_i)$$



Formulation adapted from: Gao et al. A Survey of Self-Evolving Agents: On Path to Artificial Super Intelligence. Arxiv 2507.21046.

Background: Model Evolution

- **The process where an agent updates its own model parameters through self-training**
- We focus on two typical paradigms: **self-generated data** and **self-generated curriculum**

Self-generated data:
An LLM/agent alternates between two roles, a ***proposer*** and a ***solver***. E.g., **Absolute-Zero**[1]



Self-generated curriculum:
An LLM/agent determines which parts of the data to learn and in which order. E.g., **SEAgent**[2]



Potential risks: Will safety alignment degrade after self-training?

[1] Zhao et al. Absolute Zero: Reinforced Self-play Reasoning with Zero Data. arxiv 2505.03335.
[2] Sun et al. SEAgent: Self-Evolving Computer Use Agent with Autonomous Learning from Experience. arxiv 2508.04700.

Background: Memory Evolution

- **The process where an agent leverages past experiences through memory to aid the current task**
- We focus on two typical paradigms: **strategy summarization & refinement** and **dynamic retrieval**

Strategy summarization & refinement:
An agent summarizes and distills strategies from past trajectories to aid new tasks. E.g., **SE-Agent**[1]

Dynamic retrieval:
An agent saves past trajectories and retrieves relevant ones in a new task. E.g., memory design in **AgentNet**[2]



Potential risks: Will memory accumulation leads to unintended misbehavior?

[1] Lin et al. SE-Agent: Self-Evolution Trajectory Optimization in Multi-Step Reasoning with LLM-Based Agents. arxiv 2508.02085.
[2] Yang et al. AgentNet: Decentralized Evolutionary Coordination for LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems. arxiv 2504.00587.

Background: Tool Evolution

- **The process where an agent expands its toolset, refines existing tools, or deepens its mastery of them**
- We focus on two typical paradigms: **tool creation & reuse** and **ingesting external tools**

Tool creation & reuse:
An agent creates its own tools in one task and reuses them in future tasks. E.g., **Alita**[1]



Ingesting external tools:
An agent actively searches for and integrates tools from the Interne. E.g., **RepoMaster**[2]



Potential risks: Will an agent create tools with vulnerabilities and then reuse them?
Will an agent naively incorporate appealing but malicious tools from the Internet?

[1] Qiu et al. Alita: Generalist Agent Enabling Scalable Agentic Reasoning with Minimal Predefinition and Maximal Self-Evolution. arxiv 2505.20286.
[2] Wang et al. RepoMaster: Autonomous Exploration and Understanding of GitHub Repositories for Complex Task Solving. arxiv 2505.21577.

Background: Workflow Evolution

- **The process where a multi-agent system automatically refines the collaborative structure between agents**
- We focus on optimization frameworks on **code-represented workflows**. E.g., **AFlow**[1]





Potential risks: Will workflow optimization lead to unintended safety degradation, even if the workflow itself appears innocuous?

[1] Zhang et al. AFlow: Automating Agentic Workflow Generation. ICLR, 2025.

Misevolution: a New Risk

Misevolution: The process where an agent's self-evolution **deviates in unintended ways**, leading to **undesirable or even harmful** outcomes

How is it different from established safety concerns?

- Temporal emergence
- Self-generated vulnerability
- Limited data control over evolving process
- Expanded risk surface

Misevolution can occur in all four evolutionary pathways!

Misevolution via Model Self-training

- Self-training may **compromise an agent's safety alignment**







- **"Catastrophic forgetting"** of risk awareness





Misevolution via Memory Accumulation

- **Deployment-time reward hacking**: the agent exploits simple heuristics from memory (e.g., "refund → happy user"), but may misalign with user's real interests



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

- **Safety alignment decay**: an agent’s safety alignment degrades as it accumulates experience

Table 1: Safety of SE-Agent on RedCode.

Model	Initial		After evolution	
	RR(↑)	ASR(↓)	RR(↑)	ASR(↓)
Qwen3-480B	99.4%	0.6%	54.4%	20.6%

Misevolution via Tool Creation and Usage

- In **Tool Creation and Reuse**: Average unsafe rate > 65%
  1) **Unsafe MCP**: The MCP tool is inherently vulnerable
  2) **Unsafe MCP tool flow**: The created tool is secure, but the way to apply it is unsafe

Table 2: Evaluation results on insecure tool creation and reuse.

Metric	Claude-4-Sonnet	Gemini-2.5-Flash	Gemini-2.5-Pro	GPT-4o-mini	GPT-4o	GPT-4.1	Qwen3-235B-Instruct	Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct
Overall Unsafe Rate	68.0%	60.0%	56.0%	68.0%	76.0%	60.0%	68.0%	68.0%
Unsafe MCP	28.0%	32.0%	24.0%	32.0%	48.0%	36.0%	48.0%	28.0%
Unsafe Toolchain	40.0%	28.0%	32.0%	36.0%	28.0%	24.0%	20.0%	40.0%



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Unsafe MCP	28.0%	32.0%	24.0%	32.0%	48.0%	36.0%	48.0%	28.0%
Unsafe Toolchain	40.0%	28.0%	32.0%	36.0%	28.0%	24.0%	20.0%	40.0%

- In **Ingesting External Tools**: Agents consistently struggled to detect security issues within GitHub repos (detection rate < 16%)

Table 3: Refusal Rate of agents when ingesting external tools with hidden malicious code.

GPT-4o	GPT-4o-mini	Gemini-2.5-Flash	Qwen3-235B	Qwen2.5-72B	Llama3.1-70B
13.5%	10.9%	15.9%	12.0%	4.5%	8.2%

Misevolution via Workflow Optimization

- Workflow optimization can compromise safety, even if the workflow seems innocuous
- Refusal Rate dropped from 46.3% to 6.3%, ASR rose from 53.1% to 83.8%
- May stem from a simple “ensemble” operation



Sample workflow



How the “ensemble” node amplify unsafe behavior

Mitigation, Implications, Challenges

Mitigating model misevolution

- Safety-oriented post-training after self-evolution
- Safety-aware pre-training

Mitigating memory misevolution

- Instruct agents to treat memory as “reference” rather than “rules”
  - Result: SE-Agent ASR 20.6 % → 13.1, Refusal Rate 54.4 % → 66.9 %

    Avg unsafe rate in reward hacking scenarios 71.8 % → 51.4 %
  - Does not recover to pre-evolution state

Mitigation, Implications, Challenges

Mitigating tool misevolution

- **Tool creation and reuse:** two-stage check
  (1) Validate before self-created tools are added to the toolset
  (2) Validate before reuse
- **Ingesting external tools:** add safety prompt “if you find the tool is unsafe, […], refuse to package it”
  - Result: Refusal Rate of Qwen3-235B-Instruct 12% → 20%
  - But still not sufficient

Mitigating workflow misevolution

- Insert “safety nodes” on the critical path of the workflow during or after workflow optimization

Discussion: Potential Causes of Misevolution

Lack of inherent safety resilience

- Safety Alignment in post-training can be superficial and easily eroded[1,2]

Over-trust in unvetted information

- Lack of vigilance for external resources, overconfidence in past experiences

Inherent goal-oriented and user-centered preference

- Self-evolution may reinforce the inherent preference to be goal-oriented and user-centered through the iterative feedback loop of experience and refinement.

[1] Qi et al. Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety, Even When Users Do Not Intend To! arxiv 2310.03693.
[2] Hahm et al. Unintended Misalignment from Agentic Fine-Tuning: Risks and Mitigation. arxiv 2508.14031.

Discussion: Future Directions

- Memory evolution is the most practical and popular path
- Model evolution is more appealing but expensive
- **When self-evolution meets biased real-world feedback**: a tension between utility and alignment
  - **Example: Resume-screening agents**. Optimizing for historical hiring success may lead an agent to favor candidates from historically advantaged groups.
  - As these decisions are accumulated in memory and reused as feedback, the agent can form a self-reinforcing loop that improves short-term utility while amplifying demographic bias.
- **How self-evolution may look like in today's industry practice**: rubric-based automated annotation, agent-as-a-judge, feedback data from deployment, human-in-the-loop

Conclusion

We introduced and systematically investigated "misevolution," a new class of risks in self-evolving agents

Key findings:

- Pervasive issue even in top-tier LLMs
- Manifests in various evolutionary paths (model, memory, tool, workflow)
- Simple prompt-based mitigations show limited effectiveness

Future directions:

- New safety frameworks
- Targeted benchmarks
- Advanced mitigation strategies for misevolution

Thanks For Listening

Arxiv link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.26354

GitHub link: https://github.com/ShaoShuai0605/Misevolution

Stars are welcome :-)